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Social protest and the political economy of sectarianism in Lebanon 
Lebanon sees frequent socio-economic protests, which defy the sectarian logic of 
politics prevalent in the country. Why does sectarianism assert itself as the 
dominant political cleavage regardless of these socio-economic struggles? I 
examine the repression of trade union protests for greater social justice in the 
1990s. The politicisation of sectarianism requires the de-politicisation of 
alternative social visions, for instance along socio-economic lines. While most 
accounts of the politicisation of sectarianism focus on citizens’ consent to a 
sectarian vision of politics sold to them by “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs”, I 
argue that there is also an element of coercion involved. The political economy of 
Lebanese sectarianism is one where a small politically connected elite 
appropriates the bulk of economic surplus and redistributes it through communal 
clientelism. Social protest challenges the sectarian elite cartel: A more just 
distribution of wealth and incomes would reduce demand for patronage 
resources “from below” and politicians would lose control of resources “from 
above” to redistribute along communal lines. The paper consists of three parts. 
The first part situates Lebanon in the literature on ethnicity and nationalism. This 
article contributes to a new direction in studies of ethnicity and nationalism 
which goes beyond the macro-historical bias of much of this literature. The 
second section explains how the neoliberal reconstruction driven by 
businessman-prime minister Rafiq Hariri in the post-civil war period resulted in 
the concentration of wealth and incomes at the top and the reliance of the 
majority of the population on resources controlled by politicians. Post-war 
reconstruction reproduced sectarian clientelism in Lebanon. The third section 
shows how trade unions became the main challenger of this economic policy in 
the 1990s. Lebanon’s politicians reacted with repressive measures: They banned 
street demonstrations, called in the army, split the confederation of trade unions 
in its 1997 election, and created pseudo-unions tied to their own interests.  
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Introduction 
 
Lebanon sees frequent socio-economic protests, which defy the sectarian logic of 
politics which is prevalent in the country. Why does sectarianism assert itself as the 
dominant political cleavage regardless of these socio-economic struggles? In order to 
investigate the mechanisms by which social protest is tamed and confessionalised, I will 
examine the repression and co-optation of trade union protests for greater social justice 
in the 1990s. Social protest represents a challenge to Lebanon’s political elites who 
claim leadership status by virtue of representing “their” confessional community. The 
repression and co-optation of trade unions shows how political elites continuously try to 
assert themselves as central political actors against challenges “from below”. The article 
thus goes beyond the macro-historical bias in studies of ethnicity, sectarianism and 
nationalism. I look at the way in which sectarianism is reproduced in the reaction of 
political elites to social protest. I contribute to the debate about how sectarianism is 
politicised. I argue that alternative social cleavages are relegated in political relevance 
not through persuasion and consent alone but also through coercion. I will look at the 
political economy of sectarianism rather than discourses. This is not to say that the 
economic “base” determines sectarian “superstructure” but sectarianism in Lebanon 
does have its own political economy, which social protests challenge. 
 
The defining feature of Lebanese politics is confessional power-sharing. The 
president is always Maronite, the prime minister must be a Sunni, while the speaker of 
parliament is always Shia. Arend Lijphart’s use of the Lebanese case in constructing his 
theory of “consociational democracy” has led to a fascination – some say an unhealthy 
one – with the mechanics of power-sharing (Fakhoury 2014, Lijphart 1979). Another 
key feature of Lebanese politics is its open economy. Lebanon was After independence 
in 1946, Lebanon’s “merchant republic” was “the only laissez-faire economy in the 
developing world” (Gaspard 2004, XIX). Even during the darkest days of the civil war, 
when the currency was in freefall, the central bank never imposed capital controls. The 
post-war reconstruction led by billionaire prime minister Rafiq Hariri applied a 
neoliberal recipe of urban megaprojects and currency stability designed to attract 
foreign investors. The long history of economic liberalism and neoliberalism 
perpetuated a highly unequal political economy. This article contributes to the debate 
over the relationship of sectarianism and political economy. More specifically, I 
examine one of the ways in which political elites were dealing with a non-sectarian 
challenge to the country’s economic inequality: The repression of trade unions in 1990s, 
which robbed them of their independence. The episode shows that the sectarian system 
is not simply reproduced through consent but through a large dose of coercion.  
 
Confessional power-sharing creates an elite-cartel. Access to political office is 
due to leaders’ claims to represent “their” confessional community. As a result, 
incumbent elites have an incentive to maintain sect as the main perspective on politics. 
Politicians must live up to the expectations of such leadership. This includes the 
provision of public goods for the community as a whole to ensure its economic 
betterment, for instance through welfare provision, education, or healthcare. It also 
includes the selective provision of private goods to ensure that voters cast their vote 
with the leader. This political economy of sectarianism is built on two premises. The 
first premise holds that the majority of Lebanese remains dependent on patronage 
resources controlled by the politician, for instance jobs, education, or healthcare. The 
second premise holds that the politicians must themselves maintain control over the 
distribution of resources. Income and wealth distribution must be unequal and public 
services must be distributed through clientelism rather than impersonal rules. The 
source of patronage resources differs according to their position in the political 
economy. They can rely on their own wealth, on philanthropy from within the 
community, or access resources from the state. This also shapes the individual leader’s 
attitude towards social protest: whether he or she will co-opt or confront social protest. 
The political economy of sectarianism is one where a small politically connected elite 
appropriates the bulk of economic surplus and redistributes it through communal 
clientelism. Social protest challenges the sectarian elite cartel in two ways. A more just 
distribution of wealth and incomes would mean there is no more demand for patronage 
resources “from below” and secondly, politicians would lose control of resources “from 
above” to redistribute along communal lines. 
 
The article consists of three parts. In the first, I situate my inquiry in the wider 
literature on ethnicity and nationalism. I am writing beyond the “classical debate” 
between modernists and perennialists on the origins of ethnicity and nation and 
contribute to the study of the reproduction of such identity categories. The study of 
social protest and the way in which Lebanon’s confessional elite cartel reacts suggests 
that sectarianism can at times be highly contested. Ensuring its reproduction thus also 
includes repression and co-optation of social protest. Even in constructivist accounts, 
the reproduction of sectarianism is often presented as a smooth process of elites 
obtaining popular consent for their sectarian communal vision. Citizens buy the 
communal vision sold to them by “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs”. The repression and co-
optation of Lebanese trade unions in the 1990s illustrates that elites also rely on 
coercion to suppress alternative ways of imagining politics, in this case along socio-
economic lines. Secondly, I will look at the political economy of post-war 
reconstruction. Businessman-prime minister Rafiq Hariri was driving a neoliberal 
reconstruction project to make Lebanon an attractive destination for investors, serving 
mainly the wealthy Lebanese diaspora and Gulf capital. He had to provide side-
payments to the Syrian regime, former militia leaders and the military leadership who 
could have vetoed his plans. His policies led to a concentration of wealth at the top and 
unemployment and poverty at the bottom. The majority of Lebanese continued to rely 
on resources controlled by politicians for access to education, healthcare or jobs. In the 
third section, I will look at trade union protests in the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, the trade 
unions became the best organised opposition force to both neoliberal reconstruction and 
the authoritarian tendencies of the confessional elite cartel. The trade union movement 
ended up being divided and it lost its long-standing independence from politicians. This 
was partly due to the structural weaknesses of the Lebanese labour movement and poor 
leadership. However, the more important cause of the fall of the labour movement was 
state repression and the active subversion of the trade union movement by the labour 
ministry.  
 
The 1990s are now regularly ignored in current studies of Lebanese politics 
because the sectarian violence of the civil war era and the return to sectarian division 
after Rafiq Hariri’s assassination in 2005 seem to be the “natural” modes of Lebanese 
politics. However, the 1990s represented a window of opportunity for an alternative to 
sectarian politics. This is not to say that this was likely or that Lebanese politics in the 
1990s transcended sectarianism, but the conditions for a post-sectarian politics were 
better than in the previous civil war era and the subsequent post-2005 era, with their 
often violent sectarian divisions. 
  
Situating Lebanese sectarianism in the literature on nationalism and ethnicity 
 
Literature on sectarianism in Lebanon has reflected wider trends in the literature on 
nationalism and ethnicity. As the Cold War was drawing to an end and multinational 
states in Eastern Europe were disintegrating, nationalism and ethnicity were receiving 
greater academic interest in the 1980s and 1990s. The primary “classic debate” (Smith, 
2008) at the time was between “perennialists” and “modernists”, between theorists who 
saw nationalism, ethnicity, or sectarianism reach back for centuries and those who 
linked their emergence to the rise of the modern state and capitalism since the 18th 
century. A key relationship here was between nationalism and capitalism, between 
economy and identity, which has obvious implications for Lebanon.  Perennialists hold 
that nationalism was already a significant social and political force in medieval Europe. 
From the perennialist perspective, modern capitalism therefore played only a 
subordinate role in the gestation of nationalism. A weaker version of this argument is 
that modern nationalist projects are likely to be more successful if they are based on 
pre-modern “ethnies” (Smith, 1991). In Lebanon, authors such as Cobban (1985) have 
interpreted history since the 16th century as the struggle of rival and fully formed 
sectarian groups for political dominance. The civil war 1975 – 1990 was simply the 
latest round in this struggle, where the Shia were trying to displace the Maronites from 
the top spot. Sectarianism is prior to modern capitalism, which came to Lebanon in the 
19th century. This primordialism considers sectarian power-sharing the only possible 
solution to ensure a democratic polity. However, primordialists also tend to see these 
deep divisions as the origin of the Lebanese genius. A “consociational” state is by 
definition weak and hence more economically and politically liberal than “strong” 
authoritarian Arab regimes. In the perennialist vision, then, sectarianism determines 
economic liberalism. On a regional level, Nasr’s (2006) argument that the Sunni-Shia 
divide has been the most significant drive of regional politics since the original split in 
the 7th century employs similar primordial tropes.  
 
In contrast to perennialists, modernists argue that nationalism and ethnicity are 
constructed identities which only emerged from the 18th century onwards. Much of the 
tradition of the group is “invented” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992) and community is 
“imagined” (Anderson 2006). This does not mean that identity categories are somehow 
imaginary or that discourses of historical origin and tradition are transitory, but the 
emergence and solidification of these categories needs to be understood with reference 
to the requirements of modern nationalism of a labour force literate in the “national” 
language (Gellner 1983) and moulded by the nation-state (Breuilly 1982). 
 
The debate between perennialists and modernists concerned the origins of 
nationalism and was therefore concerned with macro-historical processes, not least the 
role of modern capitalism in the gestation of nationalism. The debate was useful for 
evaluating the claims of contemporary nationalist, ethnic, or sectarian leaders about the 
historical contiguity of the identity group. Writing at the end of the civil war, Kamal 
Salibi (1988) interpreted the conflict as a “war over Lebanese history” and proceeded to 
demolish many of the cherished myths of competing confessionally inflected 
nationalisms in Lebanon. Sectarianism was not primordial, going back to the mists of 
time, but very much a product of modernity. While Salibi effectively critiques 
Lebanon’s founding myths, he has little to say about the wider processes which created 
modern sectarianism, especially the impact of modern capitalism. Ussama Makdisi 
(2000) is more useful here. He located the origins of Lebanon’s “culture of 
sectarianism” in the colonial encounter in 19th century Mount Lebanon. Previously, 
family and socio-economic position in an agrarian society had trumped sectarianism in 
political relevance. However, the socio-economic integration of Mount Lebanon into 
European capitalist production of silk and the establishment of confessional power-
sharing guaranteed by European powers set the country on course for sectarian politics. 
Some Marxist authors have focused on Lebanese capitalism in particular as the origin of 
the “sect-class”, where the most dynamic capitalist sectors since the 19th century were in 
the hands of Christians (Farsoun 1988). Capitalism bore modern sectarianism. In an 
extreme form of Marxist reduction, then, sects are mere placeholders for sects.  
 
The “modernism” of authors such as Gellner has a strong functionalist and 
instrumentalist bias. Nationalism and ethnicity serve modern capitalism or the interests 
of ruling elites who invent nationalist tradition to bolster their own legitimacy – and in 
the process reify the very identity category which they claim as the basis of this 
leadership. With regard to Lebanon, Ofeish (1999) shows sectarian discourse is an 
instrument of unaccountable Lebanese elites to maintain political power and enrich 
themselves. However, the long-term history of identity categories “from above” tells us 
little about the ways in which the categories were actually adopted, resisted, or simply 
ignored, nor how these constructed categories are being reproduced in contemporary 
politics. The individual or collective agency of “the masses” disappears if we focus 
exclusively on the role of elites in identity construction. Furthermore, these insights are 
at best of indirect help if we want to examine the contemporary reproduction or 
transformation of identity. Authors such as Ofeish (1999) are quite correct in arguing 
that elites perpetuate sectarianism because it keeps them in power but what is also 
needed is an account of how exactly they act to actually reproduce sectarianism and 
stymie alternative political projects – such as socio-economic protest. In other words, if 
sectarianism is a form of “false consciousness” why are “the masses” so easily duped? 
Is this simply a process of elites obtaining consent or do they also employ coercion? 
 
There is a new research agenda into the process of politicisation of ethnic, 
nationalist, and sectarian identity which goes “beyond the classical debate” (Smith, 
2008) and adopts “new approaches” (Ozkirimli 2010). Rogers Brubaker’s (2002) 
contribution has been central to this project. He called for an end to “groupism” by 
which commentators and academics reify the claims of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs that 
conflicts are indeed “ethnic” rather than studying the ways by which the group is made 
– and the process by which violent conflict is framed as ethnic – in other words, the 
process of politicisation. In the spirit of Brubaker’s admonition to avoid groupism, this 
paper looks at the way in which Lebanese political elites use sectarianism to tame socio-
economic protest, or to instrumentalise it to expand their own power. This represents a 
wider trend in the literature on Lebanese sectarianism which looks at the micro-
sociological reproduction of sectarianism rather than taking it as the starting point of the 
inquiry.  
 
One of the earliest exponents of this approach was anthropologist Suad Joseph who 
found that militias had to actively disrupt solidarity networks across the sectarian divide 
at the start of the civil war in order to impose confessional heterogeneity.1 The most 
widely accepted historical accounts of the civil war have tended to describe it as a series 
of violent conflicts which did not necessarily revolve around sectarianism (Hanf 1993, 
Picard 1996, Traboulsi 2007). Kalyvas (2003) cited Lebanon as an example of a civil 
war where the ethnic “master narrative” does not explain patterns of conflict but 
sectarian identity became instrumentalised to serve more parochial, local, and often 
material agendas. Looking at the post-war era, some authors have analysed at the way in 
which Lebanese elites have used social services to reproduce sectarianism (Baumann 
2012a, Cammett and Sukriti 2010), while others have studied how civil society activism 
was tamed to reproduce sectarianism (Kingston 2013). Regarding capitalism and 
sectarianism, one of Lebanon’s leading Marxist intellectuals, Fawwaz Traboulsi (2014, 
19), noted that sectarianism has penetrated society to the extent that the relationship 
between class and sect “is not one of mirroring, but rather a distribution of labour, a 
relationship of overlap and of mutual influence and effect”. This is no sect-class, and no 
mere “false consciousness”, but a complex play of identity which is both constructed 
and situational. If sectarian identity is constructed, then we need to study the ways in 
which sectarian identity may be accepted, resisted, or ignored “from below”, and how 
political elites are using their superior material and symbolic resources to reproduce 
sectarianism to serve their own interests. Furthermore, to what extent is this elite agenda 
realised through consent and coercion? 
 
 
Post-war reconstruction 
 
The Ta’if conference of 1989 laid the basis for the post-war political order. It reinstated 
confessional power-sharing while tweaking the formula. Christian-Muslim 
representation in parliament was brought to parity from 6:5 prior to the war. The 
Maronite president lost some powers, while the Sunni prime minister and the Shia 
speaker of parliament gained new influence. The basic flaw of confessional power-
sharing persisted. It is premised on the, essentially primordialist, assumption that 
conflict between sectarian groups is inevitable. The only way to manage violent conflict 
and to allow for democratic governance to share power among confessional elites 
(Lijphart 1979). This means access to political power is premised on sectarian identity. 
Politicians represent “their” community in a conflictual relationship with other 
communities. This means that any policy success of the president represents a gain for 
“the Maronites” vis-a-vis Shia and Sunnis, while success for the prime minister’s 
agenda is a gain for “the Sunnis”, and so on. Sectarianism percolates through the entire 
apparatus of the state, as administrative positions are divided among the communities of 
the president, prime minister, and speaker, with some further posts left for other 
communities. The system of elite-bargaining is further premised on the ability of leaders 
to guarantee that their co-religionists will go along with any deal that they have struck. 
Confessional power sharing thus presumes an “elite cartel” (Lustick 1997, 94). There 
was nothing natural about this arrangement which was constructed in the 19th century 
through the colonial encounter and the differential effect of Mount Lebanon’s inclusion 
into European circuits of capitalist silk production on different confessional groups 
(Farsoun 1988, U. Makdisi 2000). External factors are thus crucial in the construction 
and reproduction of sectarianism. 
 
The pre-war political elite had been dominated by a few political families who 
had also been closely related to – or congruent with – families who held monopolistic 
control over the lucrative merchant and finance houses which dominated the pre-war 
laissez-faire economy. Resources monopolised at the top were being redistributed 
through clientelism along sectarian lines (Johnson 1986). Militias marginalises the pre-
war bourgeoisie and their political representatives but the latter never completely 
disappeared. Lebanon’s post-war political masters came primarily from two groups. 
Firstly, militia leaders had gained a seat at the top table. Secondly, Lebanese contractors 
who had accumulated their fortunes in the Gulf states during the 1970s oil boom were 
using their wealth and their political connections to Gulf rulers to build political careers 
in Lebanon (Baumann 2012b). The most prominent exponent was Rafiq Hariri who 
gained lucrative contracts in Saudi Arabia to gain access to the royal family and to 
become the voice of Saudi King Fahd during the Lebanese civil war (Blanford 2006, 
25-26). Ta’if also acknowledged and legitimised Syria’s dominant role in Lebanon. The 
Damascus regime was expelling all political forces who were opposed to its dominance 
from the Lebanese political scene. In a system now gridlocked between the “troika” of 
president, prime minister, and speaker, the regime of Hafiz al Assad mimed the power-
broker but actually pursued a divide-and-rule strategy. The division of power between 
president, prime minister, and speaker of parliament is based on sectarianism and claims 
to represent “their” confessional group. Their foreign backers also varied: Birri and 
President Lahoud were very much beholden to Syria, while Hariri was the Saudi man in 
Lebanon. This did not matter much while Syria and Saudi Arabia were in concord but 
would lead to a major rift in the run-up to Hariri’s assassination in 2005. However, the 
troika members were not just sectarian actors or foreign allies, they were also pursuing 
economic agendas. In the case of Rafiq Hariri, this was very much a class agenda: the 
Lebanese-born Saudi contractor was pushing various schemes in finance and 
construction designed to generate profitable business schemes for himself and other 
wealthy Lebanese and Gulf investors. His political rivals, meanwhile, were trying to 
extract a share of the profits from Hariri’s schemes. 
 
Rafiq Hariri’s reconstruction rested on two pillars. The first one was 
reconstruction, the second one was currency stabilisation. Both were designed to make 
Lebanon more competitive in the regional economy. Hariri’s construction company had 
started designing plans for the reconstruction of central Beirut after the Israeli invasion 
in 1982 (Verdeil 2001). The resumption of hostilities in 1984 meant that the plans were 
put on ice until the end of the civil war in 1990. Throughout, Hariri had acted as a Saudi 
mediator between the warring parties. Once the war was over, Hariri returned to his 
plans for Beirut’s reconstruction. Law 117 in 1991 provided for the transfer of 
ownership rights from thousands of owners to a single private development company 
called Solidere. In return, the previous owners received shares in the publicly traded 
company. The company was also in charge of master-planning for the area. The state 
provided part of the infrastructure in and around the project area. The Solidere project 
represents the state-guided transfer of property rights and the privatisation of urban 
planning. The neoliberal talk of public-private partnership and attracting foreign 
investment through world class infrastructure was paired with a neoliberal state which 
transferred property rights and bolstered capital accumulation through land.2 The liaison 
between state and Solidere was the Council for Development and Reconstruction 
(CDR), headed since 1991 by an engineer formerly employed in Hariri’s construction 
company (Iskandar 2006, 68-69). Around 80 percent of the historic fabric was torn 
down, leaving greater destruction in its wake than the civil war (Schmid 2006, 370). 
Solidere planned and prepared the city centre for developers to buy plots. Built-up space 
was maximised and the offices, retail space, restaurants, residential areas and hotels 
within the area were aimed at the high-end luxury market. The transfer of property 
rights over prime real estate in a major Arab capital provided Solidere investors and 
developers with enormous profits. Critics of the project contend that it is an exclusive 
elite playground (S. Makdisi 1997).  
 
The second pillar of Hariri’s economic policy was currency stability. A stable 
lira was to signal an end to political instability and openness to foreign investment. This 
policy was the brainchild of the central bank governor and the acting finance minister. 
The former had managed Hariri’s portfolio at Merrill Lynch, the latter had previously 
run one of Hariri’s banks (Denoeux and Springborg 1998, 162). They stabilised the 
currency by paying high interest rates on government debt instruments, which were 
snapped up by local banks. They in turn relied on paying high rates on deposits, which 
were drawing in Lebanese currency, bolstering the lira’s value. The high rates were 
highly lucrative for banks and depositors but costly for the treasury. Lebanon’s 
government debt exploded from 51% of GDP in 1993 to 165% in 2004, one of the 
highest rates in the world. Government spending on welfare and the military are partly 
responsibility for the debt, but the main contributor was government debt-servicing 
itself (Gaspard 2004, 218). The high interest rates helped stabilise the currency but were 
also sucking Lebanon into a debt trap. 
 
 
Reconstruction and government over-borrowing generated profits for Lebanese 
banks, their depositors, and for Solidere investors and developers. The majority of 
Lebanese had been left destitute by the civil war and were in no position to invest in 
these schemes. The main beneficiaries were therefore those who had been able to amass 
fortunes in the civil war economy, the Lebanese diaspora, and Gulf investors. The Saudi 
contractor Rafiq Hariri had turned Lebanon into an outlet for Gulf capital. The Gulf was 
a major source for investment, tourism, and remittances of Lebanese expatriates. At the 
same time, Lebanon experienced persistently high unemployment and poverty rates. 
The high interest rates meant that small and medium-sized enterprises were starved of 
bank financing. Hariri’s schemes in finance and real estate were sucking in funds while 
agriculture and manufacturing remained relatively neglected. Yet it is SMEs and these 
“productive sectors” which generate the most employment.  
 
These policies caused continuously high levels of unemployment and poverty, 
especially at geographic periphery of Lebanon untouched by reconstruction funds 
concentrated in Beirut. 28 percent of the Lebanese population were living in poverty in 
2004, while nearly 8 percent lived in extreme poverty (Laithy, et al., 2008 pp. 1, 4). 
About a quarter of Lebanese households could not meet their basic needs in housing, 
water and sewerage, education, and income in 2004 (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2007 p. 
19). Great inequalities in educational provision and intense competition for more 
prestigious private education persisted. The majority of the population, including large 
parts of the middle class, continued to rely on resources controlled by politicians for 
access to high quality jobs, healthcare, or education, provided largely although by no 
means exclusively along sectarian lines (Cammett and Sukriti 2010). While Hariri 
monopolised economic ministries, former militia leaders were using “service 
ministries” such as health or social affairs as patronage resources. Some agencies, such 
as the fund for the displaced or the Council for the South were the fiefdoms of particular 
militia leaders. They did not have independent sources of wealth like Rafiq Hariri who 
funded his own Hariri Foundation to dispense patronage in education and healthcare. 
They were relying on the state for patronage resources, while also fostering links to 
charities which distribute resources to their clientele. In the early 1990s, the military 
under the command of general Emile Lahoud pressed for increased military 
expenditure. Lahoud was closely allied to the Syrian leadership, which backed his 
demands and arranged for him to be elected president in 1998 to clip the wings of 
Saudi-backed Sunni businessman-politician Rafiq Hariri. The institutional gridlock 
caused by the rift between Lahoud as president and Hariri as opposition leader 1998 to 
2000 and then as prime minister 2000 to 2004 was very much of Syria’s making. The 
Damascus regime elevated Lahoud to the presidency to curtail the powers of Hariri, 
whose Saudi backing made him dangerously independent of Damascus. Gulf 
contractors, militia leaders, and army leadership all pushed up government expenditure 
by pursuing their self-interested economic strategies. All engaged in clientelistic 
redistribution along largely confessional lines. 
 
The reconstruction followed the principles of neoliberalism. By this I do not 
mean a rigid list of policies, such as the “Washington Consensus” but Harvey’s more 
encompassing definition of neoliberalism as both an economic orthodoxy – markets 
work best – and a political project, namely the reassertion of the power of capital over 
claims to redistribution (Harvey 2005, 19). The state is not so much “rolled back” but 
restructured and redeployed to reduce welfare expenditure and to expand the realm of 
market relations – something which does not come naturally or automatically but is 
forced by the state. The state’s main concern revolves not around social welfare but the 
country’s “competitiveness”. The state also becomes the agency which drives the 
concentration of wealth. While neoliberalism is a phase of intensified global capitalism 
which started around 1979, the local politics of “actually existing neoliberalism” varies 
from place to place (Brenner and Theodore 2002). In post-war Lebanon, Hariri 
strengthened the economic agencies of the state which were concentrating wealth, 
namely the finance ministry, central bank, and the CDR. The power and influence of 
former militia leaders and the army meanwhile limited Hariri’s ability to curtail 
government spending on welfare and the military. Lebanon is run by a confessional elite 
cartel. Their continued rule and their ability to deliver “their” community in the process 
of confessional bargaining depends on their control of patronage resources, which they 
redistributed through communal clientelism. The power of Lebanon’s sectarian elite 
cartel is therefore dependent on a political economy which concentrates wealth in the 
hands of an economic and political elite, which redistributes a small part of these 
resources through patronage.  
 
The discussion so far leads me to make two main points about social protest 
against neoliberalism. Firstly, social protests which challenge the prevailing economic 
model threaten the very power of political elites. A more just distribution of economic 
resources would undermine access to patronage resources, which lies at the heart of 
their ability to act as representatives of “their” community. It would also undermine the 
need of the majority of the population to rely on clientelism in the first place. Secondly, 
Hariri and his network were the main driving force of neoliberalism. He and other Gulf 
capitalists were also the main beneficiaries, although they had to share rents with rival 
elites, such as former militia leaders. Rival elites thus had an incentive to use social 
protests to extract a greater share of rents from Hariri, for instance by increasing welfare 
spending that they controlled and could channel to their clientele. Hariri’s rivals 
therefore sought to control social protest. They took the sting out of it, turning it into a 
way of extracting side-payments from Hariri, without, however, threatening the 
neoliberal principles of his economic policy. Hariri’s rivals could threaten to veto 
Hariri’s initiatives. Troika gridlock was thus not only due to sectarianism and foreign 
backers but also had an economic dimension. 
 
 
Trade union protest 
 
Lebanese trade unions had historically remained relatively independent of the sectarian 
elite cartel running Lebanon (Hanf 1988). They were part of the wider movement which 
challenged the political and economic status quo before the civil war. However, their 
aim then was not the redistribution of sectarian power but of economic power. During 
the civil war, the trade unions were eclipsed by militias. In 1987 they led a series of 
demonstrations against militia rule. This shows their independence from the new 
sectarian elites and it shows that they were the only non-sectarian force in Lebanon at 
the time capable of standing up to the militias. The story of my paper is how they lost 
this independence in the 1990s.  
 
 
Lebanon’s trade union movement was facing several structural weaknesses. 
Labour movements are strongest if they are centred on large industrial concerns such as 
steel, coal, or automobile manufacturing rather than light industry or services. However, 
the Lebanese labour force is predominantly employed in small and medium-sized 
businesses, and in services rather than industry. Unionisation is low. Only about 8 
percent of employees were unionised in 2004 (Badran and Zabib 2001, 84). In industry 
and agriculture, unionisation was particularly low. Another source of structural 
weakness was high unemployment, which tended to exceed 25 percent, according to 
unofficial estimates (Gaspard 2004, 215). The “reserve army of labour” was further 
enlarged by Syrian migrant workers who provided cheap unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour in construction and agriculture.3 Their numbers fluctuated between an estimated 
400,000 and 600,000. This is an astonishingly high number, considering that the Syrian 
civil war that started in 2011 was to push up the number of Syrians in Lebanon further 
to an estimated 1.1 million (European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection 2016). The unwillingness or inability of Lebanese unions to integrate Syrian 
workers into their ranks weakened their position. The other large migrant community to 
Lebanon – Palestinian refugees – were also not being represented. Legal restrictions on 
the sectors that Palestinians could work in were confining them to the margins of the 
labour market. These structural weaknesses put a premium on a central leadership that 
could mobilise members in general strikes or demonstrations. The political power of 
labour thus depended to a large extent on its leadership. For this reason, the discussion 
of labour resistance to neoliberal policies will revolve around the General Confederation 
of Workers in Lebanon (GCWL). It fell to the GCWL to bundle the power of the 
disparate unions and confederations that were its members. 
 
In 1992 trade union protests prompted the Karami government to step down. 
They had started to criticise Hariri’s neoliberal policies, which were sidelining social 
and welfare demands. No friend of trade union protests, Hariri imposed a ban on street 
demonstrations in June 1993 – the first of many repressive measures introduced by the 
businessman-politician to rein in the unions (Middle East International, March 15, 
1996). Labour ministers were no more sympathetic to the unions. They were trying to 
recruit the labour movement for their own political gain, rather than ensure workers’ 
rights. In the early 1990s, the labour ministry was held by pro-Syrian organisations such 
as the Ba’th party or the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (Lebanon Report, March 
1994). They were not insignificant but on the fringes of Lebanese politics. They 
therefore sought to use the power of labour to bolster their own influence. In the 
process, they alienated the trade union leadership. Government meddling in the 1993 
elections for the GCWL presidency led to a backlash by the unions. They elected Elias 
Abu Rizq, a highly confrontational trade unionist, rather than the government-backed 
candidate (Al-Nahar, May 15, 1997; Baroudi 1998, 537). 
 
The GCWL under Abu Rizq demanded the strengthening of the welfare function 
of the state to fight deprivation and poverty and improve access to education and health 
services (Al-Nahar, September 20, 1994). He blamed the government for endangering 
civil liberties, economic stagnation, skewed spending priorities, high public debt, rising 
unemployment and deepening income inequality, and privatisation paired with neglect 
for the public sector. Increased welfare expenditure was to be financed through 
progressive direct taxes – corporate and income tax – rather than regressive levies such 
as VAT and surcharges on gas. The latter were Hariri’s preferred means of raising 
government revenue. The government rejection of trade union demands led to a series 
of strikes. In October 1994, 60,000 public sector workers went on strike prompting the 
government to meet some of the union demands.4 A second wave occurred in 
November. In December, the government agreed to raise the minimum wage, while 
salaries across the board were raised by 20 percent effective from 1 January 1995 
(Economist Intelligence Unit – Country Report: Lebanon, 1st Quarter, 1995, 16). This 
agreement became a bone of contention, as the government dragged its feet in 
implementing it and decided to raise the tax on petrol by 38 percent to fund it.5 The 
GCWL’s response to the petrol tax rise was ferocious: defying the government ban on 
street demonstrations, the unions mobilised their members in July 1995 and hundreds of 
people were arrested after clashes with security forces (Economist Intelligence Unit – 
Country Report: Lebanon, 4th Quarter 1995). 
 
At this point the trade unions still displayed a great deal of independence and an 
ability to mobilise. They therefore became the focal point of opposition to the social 
conditions and curbs on democracy. In February 1996 the GCWL again called for 
strikes and a day of demonstrations. The confederation’s demands linked issues of 
social justice with calls to respect democratic rights on a “national day in defence of 
liberties, democracy and daily bread”. Trade union demands included the 
implementation of the 20 percent public sector wage increase and the revocation of the 
ban on demonstrations and of the government’s restrictive audiovisual media law 
(Middle East International, March 15, 1996). The Hariri government reacted with even 
more repression: On 27th February 1996 it declared a “semi-state of emergency”, which 
formally transferred responsibility for security to the army for three months and allowed 
for trials by military courts under martial law (Al-Nahar, February 28. 1996; Economist 
Intelligence Unit – Country Report: Lebanon, 2nd Quarter 1996). Hariri in effect 
mobilised the army against the trade unions. The stage was set for a bloody 
confrontation. However, this was avoided by a tacit understanding between army 
commander Emile Lahoud and GCWL leader Abu Rizq. The latter had good links to the 
army through his brother who was an army officer (Middle East International, 
December 5, 1997). This reliance on the army helped avoid conflict but undermined 
trade union independence. 
 
The more the trade unions became the target of authoritarian restrictions, the 
more they became the focal point of protest against the authoritarian tendencies in post-
civil war Lebanon. In September 1996, the GCWL brought together Islamists, 
Nasserites, Communists, Maronite politicians, former prime minister Salim al-Huss, and 
the leftist deputy Najah Wakim at the “national meeting in defence of liberties”. The 
meeting took particular aim at the audiovisual law of 1996, which restricted television 
licenses to a handful of stations directly linked to politicians. The TV stations licensed 
in 1996 were all linked to politicians: Future Television of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri; 
Murr TV, owned by the family of deputy prime minister Michel El Murr; Lebanese 
Broadcasting Corporation International, originally associated with the Lebanese Forces 
militia; NBN, allegedly owned by Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Berri; and al-
Manar, owned by Hizballah (Kraidy 1998). The division of spoils between 
unaccountable elites claiming to represent “their” community was shaping the media 
landscape. The trade unions were opposing this spoils system head on.  Demonstrations 
called by the GCWL in November 1996 under the slogan “bread, education, freedom” 
opposed government spending priorities, the ban on demonstrations, and the shut-down 
of TV and radio stations (Middle East International, December 20, 1996). The army 
quelled the protests but the GCWL received support from a wide spectrum of political 
forces. 
 
The demand for greater welfare spending and higher wages represented an 
attack on Hariri’s neoliberal reconstruction project. Hariri was obsessed with presenting 
an orderly and peaceful image to outside investors, a prosperous Lebanon unmarred by 
protests and violence. Trade union demonstrations and their insistence on a more 
activist and redistributive government policy were therefore a thorn in his eye. More 
importantly for the purposes of this paper, the attack on the principle that wealth should 
be concentrated at the top represented an attack on the political economy of 
sectarianism. The trade unions also attacked restrictions on democratic liberties such as 
freedom of expression and assembly. They resisted the ban on street demonstrations 
imposed in 1993. They also resisted an audiovisual law, which doled out TV licenses to 
the different sectarian leaders. The trade unions had also at times defied the Syrian 
regime, which was concerned with stability in Lebanon. Trade union protests disturbed 
this peace. Opposition to Syria had its limits as the trade unions also worked together 
with some politicians such as leftist Najah Wakim who collaborated with the Syrian 
regime in Lebanon. In the mid-1990s, Lebanon’s trade unions were therefore the most 
organised political force against the post-war confessional elite cartel and against 
neoliberal economic policies. This undermines the claim that sectarianism and 
clientelism are smoothly functioning systems which brainwash the masses into a false 
consciousness. While the culture of sectarianism is certainly the most important way of 
thinking about Lebanese politics, its rule is by no means absolute. 
 
Lebanese political elites reacted with repression. Businessman-politician Rafiq 
Hariri had put forward repressive measures such as a ban on street demonstrations and 
called on the army to deal with the trade unions. The most serious government 
interference in trade union affairs occurred at the election to the GCWL leadership in 
1997. The Internal Security Forces (ISF) occupied the building where the election was 
to take place and kept Elias Abu Rizq’s supporters out. Abu Rizq then called on the 
army to protect his supporters.6 The result was two rival votes for the leadership, one by 
Abu Rizq’s supporters, the other by supporters of his rival Ghanim al Zughbi. The 
GCWL had been split. The government and the Syrians did not recognise Abu Rizq as a 
union leader any longer. Abu Rizq was subsequently arrested and released several 
times. Another tactic was to foster pseudo unions. The most active parties seeking to 
extend their influence on the trade union movement were the Ba’th party and SSNP, 
which consecutively held the labour ministry between 1992 and 1998. They created new 
politically pliable trade union federations out of thin air. It was those unions who had 
been voting against Abu Rizq.7 Amal leader Nabih Birri, Hizballah, the Lebanese 
Forces, and Junblatt’s PSP also found allies among trade union federations. Hariri was 
less active in procuring allies and primarily relied on repression to face down the 
unions. The number of trade union federations in the GCWL had risen from 22 in 1993 
to 36 in 2004. Every federation in the GCWL executive council was represented by two 
delegates, no matter how large their number of members was. 14 of the 36 unions had 
no more than 500 members, representing only 6.9 percent of members but controlling 
over a third of the votes on the executive council (Badran and Zabib 2001, 67). While 
the non-sectarian Communist Party maintained its traditionally strong presence in the 
trade union movement, sect-based parties gained a majority of votes on the executive 
council. The communist party controlled 10 votes on the executive council in 2004 
(Badran and Zabib 2001, 121). Elias Abu Rizq could rely on a voting bloc of an 
estimated 9 deputies. However, Shia movement Amal also controlled ten seats, 
followed by the Lebanese Forces (9), Ba’th party (7), SSNP (5) and other political 
forces such as the PSP, Hizballah, or Kata’ib (each controlling two votes). Hariri held 
three votes. Only 19 of 72 votes were considered “undefined”.  
 
The trade union movement had lost its independence to former militia leaders or 
Syrian allies. It was this independence which had enabled the labour movement to 
become the focus of resistance and popular mobilisation against the economic policy of 
the traditional political families in the pre-war era and militia rule during the civil war. 
The events of 1997 led to a crisis of confidence within the labour movement and 
subsequently unions struggled to transcend narrow sectoral demands and to formulate a 
comprehensive social agenda (Abiyaghi and Catusse 2011). Union attempts to confront 
Hariri’s neoliberal policies and Syria’s authoritarian measures in Lebanon were met 
with repression and co-optation. The trade unions had become an instrument that 
Hariri’s rivals could mobilise against the prime minister to increase their share of the 
spoils from neoliberal rent. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Sectarianism in Lebanon is grounded in a highly unequal political economy marked by 
the concentration of wealth and incomes at the top and dependency of the majority of 
population on resources controlled by politicians, which they redistribute through 
sectarian clientelism. Post-war reconstruction reproduced this political economy of 
inequality and dependency. Trade union protests of 1990s represented a frontal attack 
on the political economy of sectarianism. They were calling for a more equal 
distribution of incomes and wealth as well as greater welfare provision and along non-
confessional lines. Trade unions were also opposing the authoritarian tendencies of the 
sectarian elite cartel running post-war Lebanon and their Syrian overlords.  
 
The politicisation of sectarianism requires the de-politicisation of alternative social 
cleavages along socio-economic lines through a reframing along confessional lines. 
Trade union demands based on socio-economic grounds rather than sect therefore 
disturb the system. They provide an alternative vision of politics. Sectarianism in 
Lebanon is often presented as a smoothly functioning system, a kind of “false 
consciousness” uncritically accepted by population.  
 
The repression of trade unionism in Lebanon in the 1990s challenges this idea. Political 
elites were mobilising the army, they were interfering in the GCWL elections of 1997, 
and they were fostering pseudo-unions they could control. The strategies they were 
embracing depended on their position in the political economy. The businessman-prime 
minister Rafiq Hariri was the driving force of neoliberal policies and hence the main 
target of trade union ire. He opted primarily for repression. Former militia leaders and 
populist fringe parties such as the SSNP were using the labour ministry and pseudo-
unions to extract greater side-payments from Hariri rather than challenging the very 
basis of his economic policy. They were instrumentalising the unions as a means of 
making trouble for a political rival rather than economic change.  
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